Charles
DeKoninck claimed that he could teach the whole history of modern
philosophy as the overlooking of the distinction between what
is more known to us and what is more known in itself. This
is clear in a thinker like Descartes, who claimed that something like
motion or the soul were simply evident to him. The paradoxes of
idealism all rest on this same error: i.e. thinking that an idea is
the sort of thing so well known to us that all our knowledge could in
fact be of nothing but pure ideas.
Alfred
North Whitehead named this the fallacy of the misplaced concrete:
"The enormous success of [the enlightenment’s]
scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand matter with its
simple location in space and time, on the other hand mind,
perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not interfering, has foisted
onto philosophy the task of accepting them as the most concrete
rendering of fact. Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined. It has
oscillated in a complex manner between three extremes. There are the
dualists, who accept matter and mind as on an equal basis, and the
two varieties of monists, those who put mind inside matter, and those
who put matter inside mind. But this juggling with abstractions can
never overcome the inherent confusion introduced by the [wrongful]
ascription of misplaced concreteness to the scientific scheme of the
seventeenth century."
Voegelin
explained the fallacy with this illustration:
"A plant is
a plant. You see it. You don’t see its physical-chemical processes,
and nothing about the plant changes if you know that
physical-chemical processes are going on inside. How these processes
will result in what you experience immediately as a plant (a rose or
an oak tree), you don’t know anyway. So if you know these
substructures in the lower levels of the ontic hierarchy and go into
the physical, chemical, molecular and atomic structures, even farther
down, the greater becomes the miracle how all that thing is a plant.
Nothing is explained."
If one seeks to construct an
explanation of a plant—or a soul, or a text, or a bat—from the
material knowledge gained through science he commits the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness. “If you deform your experience by trying to
explain what you experience by the things which you don’t
experience by which you know only by science, you get a perverted
imagination of reality—if you see a rose as a physical or atomic
process.”
This
“scientistic ignorance becomes a civilizational disaster because
the substantial ordering of existence cannot be achieved through the
acquisition of knowledge in the phenomenal sense.” The problem
proceeds beyond mere ignorance (which can be remedied, though not
easily) when the “belief in the self-sufficient ordering of
existence through science is socially entrenched. … The
spiritual desire, in the Platonic sense, must be very strong in a
young man of our time in order to overcome the obstacles that social
pressure puts in the way of its cultivation.” This
creates social stratification through the mechanisms of prestige and
various economic incentives. It also gives rise to what Voegelin
calls “aggressive dilettantism” in matters outside the narrow
purview of the expertise possessed by the scientist and imposed as a
standard on all others. “What the scientistic dilettante cannot
understand must not be proposed in discussions of a problem.”